The Challenges of Backsourcing: Silent Contracts and Informal Dependencies in Public Sector Backsourcing
2026 (English)In: Financial Accountability and Management, ISSN 0267-4424, E-ISSN 1468-0408Article in journal (Refereed) Epub ahead of print
Abstract [en]
Public sector outsourcing sometimes ends in unexpected termination, forcing authorities to engage in backsourcing. The aim of this study is to identify the challenges posed by unexpected terminations of sourcing contracts in the public sector and analyze how actual practices in these situations diverge from theoretical expectations in the sourcing literature. A comparative analysis of three cases—spanning municipal, regional, and national levels—reveals that authorities face constraints such as legal obligations, limited provider options and built-in interdependence with contractors. Combined with market limitations, these interdependencies often lead to opportunistic behavior and informal “silent contracts” with public authorities that display increased tolerance and relaxed oversight to ensure service continuity. Factors such as stringent contractual requirements, unplanned dependencies, and the absence of qualified replacements add to the complexity. This highlights a gap between market theories and the practical constraints of public sector outsourcing. This study contributes to sourcing literature by emphasizing the need for proactive planning and by providing a more profound understanding of silent contracts and informal dependencies that help explain and clarify backsourcing process.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
John Wiley & Sons, 2026.
Keywords [en]
backsourcing, new public management, outsourcing, silent contracts, termination of public contracts
National Category
Public Administration Studies Business Administration Sociology (Excluding Social Work, Social Anthropology, Demography and Criminology)
Research subject
Research on Citizen Centered Health, University of Skövde (Reacch US)
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:his:diva-26224DOI: 10.1111/faam.70033ISI: 001724012000001OAI: oai:DiVA.org:his-26224DiVA, id: diva2:2048987
Funder
Swedish Research Council, 2016-01680Swedish Research Council, 2017-02169
Note
CC BY 4.0
Correspondence: Johan Berlin (johan.berlin@hv.se)
First published: 26 March 2026
We thank the Swedish Research Council (grant no. 2016-01680 and 2017-02169) for funding this research. We would also like to warmly thank the three public organisations that generously participated and contributed by providing access, dedicating their time to interviews, and supporting other data collection efforts in an exemplary manner. Furthermore, we would also like to thank the editors of Financial Accountability and Management and the three anonymous reviewers for their detailed and helpful comments.
2026-03-262026-03-262026-04-07Bibliographically approved