This dissertation discusses the view that embodied cognition is essentially internal simulation (or emulation) of perception and action, and that the same (neural) mechanisms are underlying both real and simulated perception and action. More specifically, it surveys evidence supporting the simulation view from different areas of cognitive science (neuroscience, perception, psychology, social cognition, theory of mind). This is integrated with related research in situated robotics and directions for future work on internal simulation of perception and action in robots are outlined. In sum, the ideas discussed here provide an alternative view of representation, which is opposed to the traditional correspondence notions of representation that presuppose objectivism and functionalism. Moreover, this view is suggested as a viable route for situated robotics, which due to its rejection of traditional notions of representation so far has mostly dealt with more or less reactive behavior, to scale up to a cognitive robotics, and thus to further contribute to cognitive science and the understanding of higher-level cognition