Högskolan i Skövde

This study examines trait-level sense of self in 32 participants with varying meditation experience, with a special focus on the sense of self-boundaries and the sense of being a subject of experience, what is here referred to as perspectival ownership of experience. Results from qualitative and quantitative analyses of in-depth phenomenological interviews suggested a quadratic relation between self-boundaries and perspectival ownership of experience, so that participants with either a strong or weak sense of self-boundaries reported little or no sense of perspectival ownership of experience, while participants in the middle range mentioned a salient sense in their everyday life. This is in contrast to the expected linear relation between these two aspects of the sense of self. We additionally highlight issues with self-report measures of trait self-transcendence and recommend the use of an ungraded visual analogue scale as a quick and reliable measure of the sense of self-boundaries. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved)

Purpose: To evaluate the neurophenomenology of automatic writing (AW) in a spontaneous automatic writer (NN) and four high hypnotizables (HH). Methods: During fMRI, NN and the HH were cued to perform spontaneous (NN) or induced (HH) AW, and a comparison task of copying complex symbols, and to rate their experience of control and agency. Results: Compared to copying, for all participants AW was associated with less sense of control and agency and decreased BOLD signal responses in brain regions implicated in the sense of agency (left premotor cortex and insula, right premotor cortex, and supplemental motor area), and increased BOLD signal responses in the left and right temporoparietal junctions and the occipital lobes. During AW, the HH differed from NN in widespread BOLD decreases across the brain and increases in frontal and parietal regions. Conclusions: Spontaneous and induced AW had similar effects on agency, but only partly overlapping effects on cortical activity.

Essential tremor (ET) is characterized by bilateral upper limb postural and/or kinetic tremor, but also cognitive deficits. Tremor in ET, as well as aspects of cognitive deficits associated with ET, have been suggested to be linked to dysfunction in the cerebello-thalamo-cerebral circuit. In ET patients with disabling and medically intractable motor symptoms, Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) is effective in reducing tremor. DBS in the caudal Zona incerta (cZi) has been shown to modulate the activity of the sensorimotor cerebello-cerebral circuit during motor tasks. Whether the activity in the cerebello-cerebral circuit is modulated by DBS during tasks involving working memory is unknown. The present study therefore aimed to investigate the possible effects of cZi DBS on working-memory processing in ET patients by means of task-based blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) fMRI.

Thirteen ET patients completed a working-memory task during DBS OFF and ON conditions. The task involved three conditions: maintenance, manipulation, and control. Behaviorally, there was no significant effect from DBS on accuracy, but a marginally significant Task x DBS interaction was detected for response times (RTs). However, post hoc comparisons for each condition failed to reach statistical significance. FMRI analyses revealed that DBS did not alter BOLD signal in regions of interest (lateral prefrontal cortex, parietal cortex, and the cerebellum), or in a complementary whole-brain analysis.

The present study indicates that DBS in the cZi in patients with ET has at most marginal effects on working memory, which is consistent with the results of pre- and post-DBS neuropsychological assessment showing minimal cognitive effects of surgery.

Alterations of the sense of self induced by meditation include an increased sense of boundarylessness. In this study, we investigated behavioural and functional magnetic resonance imaging correlates of trait self-boundarylessness during resting state and the performance of two experimental tasks. We found that boundarylessness correlated with greater self-endorsement of words related to fluidity and with longer response times in a math task. Boundarylessness also correlated negatively with brain activity in the posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus during mind-wandering compared to a task targeting a minimal sense of self. Interestingly, boundarylessness showed quadratic relations to several measures. Participants reporting low or high boundarylessness, as compared to those in between, showed higher functional connectivity within the default mode network during rest, less brain activity in the medial prefrontal cortex during self-referential word processing, and less self-endorsement of words related to constancy. We relate these results to our previous findings of a quadratic relation between boundarylessness and the sense of perspectival ownership of experience. Additionally, an instruction to direct attention to the centre of experience elicited brain activation similar to that of meditation onset, including increases in anterior precentral gyrus and anterior insula and decreases in default mode network areas, for both non-meditators and experienced meditators.

In this study, we investigate the phenomenology of selftranscendent experiences, in which the usual sense of self is lost. Based on a taxonomy of nine aspects of self and three types of content of consciousness, we compare ten accounts of such experiences acquired through in-depth interviews. Sense of separateness and identification with body and narrative self were reported as lost in all of these. However, bodily awareness, spatial self-location, sense of agency, perspectival ownership of experience, thoughts, emotions, sensory impressions, metacognition, and personal identity were variously reported as lost or retained. Individual participants emphasized the absence of either of these 'optional' aspects as crucial for their judgment that the experience was without self. We conclude that there is a large variety in what is felt as being lost in self-transcendent experiences, and we recommend that research and theory avoid general terms such as 'ego-dissolution' and instead probe more precisely the different aspects of self.

The abeyance of self-consciousness (SC) during hypnosis has been discussed as a central aspect of hypnosis, yet dispositional SC has been very rarely evaluated as a correlate of hypnotizability. In this study (N = 328), the authors administered the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility (HGSHS), the Inventory Scale of Hypnotic Depth (ISHD), and the Self-Consciousness Scale-Revised (SCS-R). Women tended to score higher than men on the HGSHS, besides experiencing greater ISHD automaticity. The Discontinuity (with everyday experiences) subscale of the ISHD correlated with the Public Self-Consciousness scale of the SCS-R and with the Private Self-Consciousness subscale (using simple, quadratic, and cubic regressions). Being concerned about the perception of others related to experiencing hypnosis as discontinuous with everyday life, which also related to being more introspective and interested in subjectivity at the middle range of scores. The article concludes with suggestions on how to pursue the implications of these results, including testing for nonlinear relations.

Throughout history, people have described alterations of consciousness in which they experienced a sense of transcendence, being part of a much larger unity, sometimes encompassing the whole universe, or of being pure awareness. These experiences have been foundational for many religious and spiritual practices, albeit they have sometimes been treated as suspect or outright psycho- and or neuro-pathological. This chapter defines various aspects of the self, self-transcendence, and mystical experiences (ME), discusses the relation of ME with other constructs, its prevalence, psychological and demographic correlates, and its relation to mental health, reviews brain-imaging research on it, and concludes with a discussion of its ontological implications. By doing so, it seeks to give an overview of both enlightenment experiences, ‘the light,’ and the underlying neurophysiological processes, ‘the bulb’.