Högskolan i Skövde

Posttraumatic symptoms, including nightmares, are more prevalent in World War II survivors than in the general population, but how war experiences have affected subsequent dream content in specific survivor populations remains less explored. In the present study, we used self -reports collected in 1973 from Polish Auschwitz survivors (N = 150; 45 women) to investigate the prevalence of posttraumatic symptoms, classified according to the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Furthermore, we classified main themes, central emotions, and threatening events in the dreams (N = 632) of the survivors, comparing dreams recalled from before, during, and after the war. Of the respondents, 12.7% described experiencing all diagnostic criteria for PTSD. War-related themes were less common in dreams dreamt before than during the war but were most common after the war. Themes related to family and freedom were most likely to appear in dreams dreamt during than before or after the war. The most often occurring emotion was fear, and dreams from after the war were likely to contain more negative and less positive emotions than dreams dreamt during the war. The likelihoods of reporting threatening events and threats involving aggression were higher in dreams dreamt during than before the war and in dreams dreamt after than during the war. In conclusion, PTSD symptoms were common in Polish Auschwitz survivors 30 years after World War II, and the themes, emotions, and threatening events in their dreams seem to reflect lifelong posttraumatic dreaming. We interpret the results as lending support for the threat simulation theory of dreaming.

Episodic memories of emotionally salient and personally significant events are often incorporated into dreams, although rarely replayed identically to the original waking event except in replicative posttraumatic nightmares. We investigated, in five Swedish female 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami survivors, how episodic memories of the catastrophe were reflected in their dreams after trauma, both in retrospectively recalled nightmares and bad dreams, and in prospective dream diaries completed several months after the catastrophe. We also assessed whether the emotional and threatening dream content differed between the trauma and a matched control group. Based on the threat simulation theory, we predicted that the trauma group dreams would portray notable similarities with elements related to the original tsunami trauma, and that the trauma group would demonstrate a higher prevalence of negative emotional states, and a higher frequency of threatening dream events as well as more severe threats in their dreams. Only the first hypothesis was partially supported, with retrospective nightmares bearing higher similarity to the trauma experience than the prospective dream diary dreams. However, we observed no statistically significant differences in emotional or threatening dream content between the groups, suggesting that the trauma group participants were not suffering from significant posttraumatic dreaming at the time of systematic dream data collection. Yet, specific features of the trauma group dreams might be interpreted as remnants of episodic tsunami-related memories: Their dreams had a higher percentage of life-threatening events depicting realistic but improbable threats, and an analysis of water-related themes evidenced stressful themes related to waves.

Sverige behöver utveckla en etikprövning som hanterar olika discipliner på olika sätt. Och som inte bygger på en svartvit legalistisk syn på etik. Det skriver Oskar MacGregor, etikexpert inom Horisont Europa

If a technology being used by elite athletes to gain a competitive edge marks some sort of coming of age for said technology, then I suppose electrical and magnetic brain stimulation has now, it would seem, finally come of age. Gone are the days of debilitating One-Flew-Over-The-Cuckoo's-Nest-style electroshock jolts, replaced by sleek and sexy marketing for low-current "cognitive enhancement" devices, promising everything from improved focus to - as revealed by a quick traipse through Google and Reddit - increased creativity and intelligence, as well as helping you both win competitions and quit smoking while you're at it! And with this development, an attendant fear of its misuse, for creating unfair advantages - not least among elite athletes, with their federations' obsessive focus on (certain specific forms of) fairness - to the point that the journal Neuroethics recently dedicated a special issue to this topic of "neurodoping". But, perhaps not too surprisingly, reality doesn't really live up to the hype. While various individual studies can be found to support the view that brain stimulation might enhance performance, this takes place against a broad backdrop of serious issues within empirical neuroscience and psychology more generally, relating to all manner of problems with sample sizes, methods, assumptions, etc., along with some plain old ignorance about how to properly deal with all of these. In this talk, I will therefore give the briefest of introductions as to why essentially all existing claims about the purportedly performance-enhancing effects of transcranial electric stimulation (TES) and transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) are claiming far too much, far too soon. As far as we really know, based on what robust evidence actually exists today, "neurodoping" of this sort gives no more a competitive advantage than does rubbing your lucky rabbit's foot.

Recent discussions among lawyers, philosophers, policy researchers and athletes have focused on the potential threat to privacy posed by the World Anti-Doping Agency’s (WADA) whereabouts requirements. These requirements demand, among other things, that all elite athletes file their whereabouts information for the subsequent quarter on a quarterly basis and comprise data for one hour of each day when the athlete will be available and accessible for no advance notice testing at a specified location of their choosing. Failure to file one’s whereabouts, or the non-availability for testing at said location on three occasions within any 18-month period constitutes an anti-doping rule violation that is equivalent to testing positive to a banned substance, and may lead to a suspension of the athlete for a time period of between one and two years. We critically explore the extent to which WADA’s whereabouts requirements are in tension with existing legislation on privacy, with respect to UK athletes, who are simultaneously protected by UK domestic and EU law. Both UK domestic and EU law are subject to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) Article 8, which establishes a right to “respect for private and family life, home and correspondence”. We critically discuss the centrality of the whereabouts requirements in relation to WADA’s aims, and the adoption and implementation of its whereabouts rules. We conclude that as WADA’s whereabouts requirements appear to be in breach of an elite athlete’s rights under European workers’ rights, health & safety and data protection law they are also, therefore, in conflict with Article 8 of the ECHR and the UK Human Rights Act 1998. We call for specific amendments that cater for the exceptional case of elite sports labour if the WADA requirements are to be considered legitimate.

Brent Kious has objected to our previous criticism of his views on doping, maintaining that we, by and large, misrepresented his position. In this response, we strengthen our original misgivings, arguing that (1) his views on risk of harm in sport are either uncontroversially true (not inconsistent with the views of many doping opponents) or demonstrably false (attribute to doping opponents an overly simplistic view), (2) his use of analogies (still) indicates an oversimplification of many issues surrounding the question of doping in sports, and (3) his doping analogies are insufficiently precise to support his conclusions.

Brent Kious has recently attacked several arguments generally adduced to support anti-doping in sports, which are widely supported by the sports medicine fraternity, international sports federations, and international governments. We show that his attack does not succeed for a variety of reasons. First, it uses an overly inclusive definition of doping at odds with the WADA definition, which has global, if somewhat contentious, currency. Second, it seriously misconstrues the position it attacks, rendering the attack without force against a more balanced construal of an anti-doping position. Third, it makes unwarranted appeals to matters Kious considers morally 'clear', while simultaneously attacking a position many others take to be equally morally 'clear', namely that of anti-doping. Such an inconsistency, attacking and appealing to the moral status quo as befits one's argument, is not acceptable without further qualification. Fourth, his position suffers from a general methodological flaw of over-reliance upon argumentation by analogy. Moreover, it is argued that the analogies, being poorly selected and developed, fail to justify his conclusion that the anti-doping lobby lacks philosophical and moral authority for its stance. These issues are symptomatic of a more fundamental problem: any attempt at providing a blanket solution to the question of whether doping is morally acceptable or not is bound to run up against problems when applied to highly specific contexts. Thus, rather than reaching any particular conclusion for or against doping products or processes in this article, we conclude that an increased context-sensitivity will result in a more evenhanded appraisal of arguments on the matter.

In this study, we explored how contextual information about threat dynamics affected the electrophysiological correlates of face perception. Forty-six healthy native Swedish speakers read verbal descriptions signaling an immediate vs delayed intent to escalate or deescalate an interpersonal conflict. Each verbal description was followed by a face with an angry or neutral expression, for which participants rated valence and arousal. Affective ratings confirmed that the emotional intent expressed in the descriptions modulated emotional reactivity to the facial stimuli in the expected direction. The electrophysiological data showed that compared to neutral faces, angry faces resulted in enhanced early and late event-related potentials (VPP, P300 and LPP). Additionally, emotional intent and temporal immediacy modulated the VPP and P300 similarly across angry and neutral faces, suggesting that they influence early face perception independently of facial affect. By contrast, the LPP amplitude to faces revealed an interaction between facial expression and emotional intent. Deescalating descriptions eliminated the LPP differences between angry and neutral faces. Together, our results suggest that information about a person's intentions modulates the processing of facial expressions. 

Persuasion is a process that aims to utilize (true or false) information to change people’s attitudes in relation to something, usually as a precursor to behavioural change. Its use is prevalent in democratic societies, which do not, in principle, permit censorship of information or the use of force to enact power. The transition of information to the internet, particularly with the rise of social media, together with the capacity to capture, store and process big data, and advances in machine learning, have transformed the way modern persuasion is conducted. This has led to new opportunities for persuaders, but also to well-documented instances of abuse: fake news, Cambridge Analytica, foreign interference in elections, etc. We investigate large-scale technology-based persuasion, with the help of three case studies derived from secondary sources, in order to identify and describe the underlying technology architecture and propose issues for future research, including a number of ethical concerns.

The Threat Simulation Theory (TST) postulates that dreaming evolved as a mental simulation for the rehearsal of the neurocognitive mechanisms essential for threat recognition and avoidance behaviors. In the present study, we tested the predictions of the TST that dreams are specialized in the frequent simulation of realistic and severe threatening events targeted against the dream self, and that the dream self is likely to take appropriate defensive actions against the threat. The subjects were 50 Swedish university students who kept home-based dream diaries for a period of two or four weeks. The dreams were analyzed with a content analysis method specifically designed for identifying and classifying threatening events in dreams, the Dream Threat Scale. Our results show that in the dreams of ordinary young adults threatening events are frequent, severe, realistic and targeted against the self and significant others. Appropriate defensive actions are frequently undertaken when the situation allows active participation. The present study replicates earlier findings but in an independent sample, collected in a different country and language area, and analyzed by judges different from the original study. Our findings thus offer further support for the predictions of the TST