Högskolan i Skövde

When two successive, spatially overlapping, targets (S1 and S2) are presented on a blank background, S2 typically dominates in explicit perception. We tested whether S2 dominance is also found for the conditions of presenting S1 and S2 in a stream of irrelevant objects. Successive target letters were presented within a stream of invariant stimulus items (capital Is). The stream items were presented either as a perceptually continuous object where both type and token appeared invariant (60-Hz stream) or as a flickering stream of successive replicas of the invariant stationary object where the type appeared invariant but the token appearance seemed intermittent (20-Hz condition). Compared to the control condition where targets were presented on a blank background we found that (1) recognition rate was lower for targets embedded in a perceptually continuous type-and-token object (60 Hz), but was unchanged for targets in a perceptually flickering sequence of the invariant-object tokens (20 Hz); (2) S1 recognition rate was higher compared to S2 recognition rate within the first epoch of stream (0-150 ms) while within the later stream-epochs S2 dominated over S1 as usual; (3) the overall difference in recognition rates between S1 and S2 was decreased. The results are discussed in the theoretical context of visual masking and attentional blink.

Objective: Vaccines are an effective means to reduce the spread of diseases, but they are sometimes met with hesitancy that needs to be understood. Method: In this study, we analyzed data from a large, cross-country survey conducted between June and August 2021 in 43 countries (N = 15,740) to investigate the roles of trust in government and science in shaping vaccine attitudes and willingness to be vaccinated. Results: Despite significant variability between countries, we found that both forms of institutional trust were associated with a higher willingness to receive a COVID-19 vaccine. Furthermore, we found that conspiratorial thinking and anti-expert sentiments predicted reduced trust in government and science, respectively, and that trust mediated the relationship between these two constructs and ultimate vaccine attitudes. Although most countries displayed similar relationships between conspiratorial thinking and anti-expert sentiments, trust in government and science, and vaccine attitudes, we identified three countries (Brazil, Honduras, and Russia) that demonstrated significantly altered associations between the examined variables in terms of significant random slopes. Conclusions: Cross-country differences suggest that local governments’ support for COVID-19 prevention policies can influence populations’ vaccine attitudes. These findings provide insight for policymakers to develop interventions aiming to increase trust in the institutions involved in the vaccination process.

During the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the COVIDiSTRESS Consortium launched an open-access global survey to understand and improve individuals’ experiences related to the crisis. A year later, we extended this line of research by launching a new survey to address the dynamic landscape of the pandemic. This survey was released with the goal of addressing diversity, equity, and inclusion by working with over 150 researchers across the globe who collected data in 48 languages and dialects across 137 countries. The resulting cleaned dataset described here includes 15,740 of over 20,000 responses. The dataset allows cross-cultural study of psychological wellbeing and behaviours a year into the pandemic. It includes measures of stress, resilience, vaccine attitudes, trust in government and scientists, compliance, and information acquisition and misperceptions regarding COVID-19. Open-access raw and cleaned datasets with computed scores are available. Just as our initial COVIDiSTRESS dataset has facilitated government policy decisions regarding health crises, this dataset can be used by researchers and policy makers to inform research, decisions, and policy.

The human frontal cortex is asymmetrically involved in motivational and affective processing. Several studies have shown that the left-frontal hemisphere is related to positive and approach-related affect, whereas the right-frontal hemisphere is related to negative and withdrawal-related affect. The present study aimed to investigate whether evolutionarily threatening stimuli modulate asymmetrical frontal activity. We examined hemispheric differences in frontal late positive potentials (f-LPP asymmetry) and frontal alpha power activation (frontal alpha asymmetry, FAA) in response to images depicting snakes, spiders, butterflies, and birds. Results showed that the late component of f-LPP asymmetry, but not FAA, was modulated by the category of stimuli. Specifically, threatening stimuli (snakes and spiders) evoked a relatively large late f-LPP over the right-frontal hemisphere than non-threatening stimuli (birds and butterflies). Moreover, this relatively great right-frontal activity was positively associated with the subjective ratings of fear. Importantly, the subjective ratings of fear were not associated with early brain activity over the occipital or centro-parietal cortices. These results suggest that late f-LPP asymmetry may reflect higher order affective processes, specifically the subjective appraisal of threatening stimuli and the subjective experience of fear, that are independent of the fast and automatic processing of evolutionarily significant and affectively arousing stimuli. 

Increased psychological flexibility (PF) may underlie the lasting positive effects of psychedelic experiences on mental well-being. The associations between different components of PF, psychological inflexibility (PI), and well-being with psychedelic use are not well understood. We conducted a cross-sectional internet survey of participants (N = 629) with experience of classical psychedelics. Using network analysis, we examined how aspects of a single psychedelic experience (mystical-type features and psychological insights) and the frequency of past psychedelic use, were associated with current PF and PI components, as well as with mental well-being and ill-being. Mediation analyses explored whether PF mediated the relationship between past psychedelic use and well-being or ill-being. The network analysis linked psychological insight to the PF component Acceptance, with no association found between the frequency of past use and PF. Mediation analyses showed PF mediates the association between past psychedelic use and well-being and ill-being. These results suggest that the quality and depth of the psychedelic experience, rather than the frequency of use, are primarily linked to psychological flexibility, particularly Acceptance, and overall well-being. This underscores the importance of treating PF as a multidimensional construct to better understand the long-term mental health benefits of psychedelics. 

The COVIDiSTRESS global survey collects data on early human responses to the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic from 173 429 respondents in 48 countries. The open science study was co-designed by an international consortium of researchers to investigate how psychological responses differ across countries and cultures, and how this has impacted behaviour, coping and trust in government efforts to slow the spread of the virus. Starting in March 2020, COVIDiSTRESS leveraged the convenience of unpaid online recruitment to generate public data. The objective of the present analysis is to understand relationships between psychological responses in the early months of global coronavirus restrictions and help understand how different government measures succeed or fail in changing public behaviour. There were variations between and within countries. Although Western Europeans registered as more concerned over COVID-19, more stressed, and having slightly more trust in the governments' efforts, there was no clear geographical pattern in compliance with behavioural measures. Detailed plots illustrating between-countries differences are provided. Using both traditional and Bayesian analyses, we found that individuals who worried about getting sick worked harder to protect themselves and others. However, concern about the coronavirus itself did not account for all of the variances in experienced stress during the early months of COVID-19 restrictions. More alarmingly, such stress was associated with less compliance. Further, those most concerned over the coronavirus trusted in government measures primarily where policies were strict. While concern over a disease is a source of mental distress, other factors including strictness of protective measures, social support and personal lockdown conditions must also be taken into consideration to fully appreciate the psychological impact of COVID-19 and to understand why some people fail to follow behavioural guidelines intended to protect themselves and others from infection. The Stage 1 manuscript associated with this submission received in-principle acceptance (IPA) on 18 May 2020. Following IPA, the accepted Stage 1 version of the manuscript was preregistered on the Open Science Framework at https://osf.io/g2t3b. This preregistration was performed prior to data analysis.

Background

Alexithymia is a key transdiagnostic risk factor for emotion-based psychopathologies. Conceptual models specify that this is because alexithymia impairs emotion regulation. However, the extent of these putative emotion regulation impairments remains underexplored. Our aim in this study was to begin to address this gap by examining whether people with high, average, or low levels of alexithymia differ in the types of emotion regulation strategies they typically use.

Method

General community adults from the United States (N = 501) completed a battery of alexithymia and emotion regulation measures. Participants were grouped into high, average, and low alexithymia quantiles.

Results

After controlling for demographics and current levels of distress, the high, average, and low alexithymia groups differed in their use of cognitive and behavioral emotion regulation strategies. Compared to the other groups, the high alexithymia group reported lesser use of generally adaptive regulation strategies (cognitive reappraisal, approaching problems, and seeking social support) and greater use of generally maladaptive regulation strategies (expressive suppression, behavioral withdrawal, ignoring).

Limitations

Our data were cross-sectional and from self-report questionnaires. Future work in other cultural groups would be beneficial.

Conclusions

Our results support the view that alexithymia is associated with impaired emotion regulation. In particular, people with high alexithymia seem to exhibit a less adaptive profile of emotion regulation strategies. Direct targeting of these emotion regulation patterns in psychotherapy may therefore be a useful pathway for the treatment of emotional disorder symptoms in people with high alexithymia.

BACKGROUND: Alexithymia is a trait characterized by difficulties identifying feelings, difficulties describing feelings, and externally orientated thinking. It is widely regarded as an important transdiagnostic risk factor for a range of psychopathologies, including depressive and anxiety disorders. Whilst several well-validated psychometric measures of alexithymia exist, these are relatively lengthy, thus limiting their utility in time-pressured settings. In this paper, we address this gap by introducing and validating a brief 6-item version of the Perth Alexithymia Questionnaire, called the Perth Alexithymia Questionnaire-Short Form (PAQ-S). METHOD: Across two studies with adult samples (Study 1 N = 508 United States community; Study 2 = 378 Australian college students), we examined the psychometric properties of the PAQ-S in terms of its factor structure, reliability, and concurrent/criterion validity. RESULTS: In exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses, all PAQ-S items loaded well on a single general alexithymia factor. The PAQ-S total score had high reliability, and correlated as expected with the long-form of the PAQ, as well as other established markers of alexithymia, emotion regulation, and affective disorder symptoms. LIMITATIONS: Our samples were general community or college student samples from two Western countries; future validation work in clinical samples and more diverse cultural groups is thus needed. CONCLUSIONS: The PAQ-S retains the psychometric strengths of the PAQ. As such, the PAQ-S can be used as a quick, robust measure of overall alexithymia levels. The introduction of the PAQ-S hence enables valid assessments of alexithymia in a more diverse range of settings and research designs. 

Background: Alexithymia is a multidimensional trait comprised of difficulties identifying feelings, difficulties describing feelings, and externally orientated thinking. It is regarded as an important risk factor for emotional disorders, but there are presently limited data on each specific facet of alexithymia, or the extent to which deficits in processing negative emotions, positive emotions, or both, are important. In this study, we address these gaps by using the Perth Alexithymia Questionnaire (PAQ) to comprehensively examine the relationships between alexithymia and depression, anxiety, and stress symptoms. Methods: University students (N = 1250) completed the PAQ and the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales-21. Pearson correlations, hierarchical regressions, and latent profile analysis were conducted. Results: All facets of alexithymia, across both valence domains, were significantly correlated with depression, anxiety, and stress symptoms (r = 0.27–0.40). Regression analyses indicated that the alexithymia facets, together, could account for a significant 14.6 %–16.4 % of the variance in depression, anxiety, and stress. Difficulties identifying negative feelings and difficulties identifying positive feelings were the strongest unique predictors across all symptom categories. Our latent profile analysis extracted eight profiles, comprising different combinations of alexithymia facets and psychopathology symptoms, collectively highlighting the transdiagnostic relevance of alexithymia facets. Limitations: Our study involved a student sample, and further work in clinical samples will be beneficial. Conclusions: Our data indicate that all facets of alexithymia, across both valence domains, are relevant for understanding depression, anxiety, and stress. These findings demonstrate the value of facet-level and valence-specific alexithymia assessments, informing more comprehensive understanding and more targeted treatments of emotional disorder symptoms. 

Background: Alexithymia is an important transdiagnostic risk factor for emotion-based psychopathologies. However, it remains unclear whether alexithymia questionnaires actually measure alexithymia, or whether they measure emotional distress. Our aim here was to address this discriminant validity concern via exploratory factor analysis (EFA) of the 20-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20) and the Perth Alexithymia Questionnaire (PAQ). Method: United States general community adults (N = 508) completed the TAS-20, PAQ, and the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales-21 (DASS-21). EFA was used to examine the latent dimensions underlying these measures' scores. Results: Our EFA extracted two higher-order factors, an “alexithymia” factor and a “general distress” factor (i.e., depression, anxiety, stress). All PAQ scores loaded cleanly on the alexithymia factor, with no cross-loadings on the distress factor. However, for the TAS-20, Difficulty Identifying Feelings (DIF) facet scores cross-loaded highly on the distress factor. Limitations: Our sample consisted of general community adults; future work in clinical settings will be useful. Conclusions: Our data indicate that the PAQ has good discriminant validity. However, the TAS-20 appears to have significant discriminant validity problems, in that much of the variance in its DIF facet reflects people's current levels of distress, rather than alexithymia. The TAS-20, which has traditionally been the most widely used alexithymia questionnaire, may therefore not be the optimal alexithymia tool. Our findings add to the body of evidence supporting the validity and utility of the PAQ and suggest that, moving forward, it is a superior option to the TAS-20 for alexithymia assessments.

Learning to pronounce a foreign phoneme requires an individual to acquire a motor program that enables the reproduction of the new acoustic target sound. This process is largely based on the use of auditory feedback to detect pronunciation errors to adjust vocalization. While early auditory evoked neural activity underlies automatic detection and adaptation to vocalization errors, little is known about the neural correlates of acquiring novel speech targets. To investigate the neural processes that mediate the learning of foreign phoneme pronunciation, we recorded event-related potentials (ERP) when participants (N=19) pronounced native or foreign phonemes. Behavioral results indicated that the participants’ pronunciation of the foreign phoneme improved during the experiment. Early auditory responses (N1 and P2 waves, approx. 85–290 ms after the sound onset) revealed no differences between foreign and native phonemes. In contrast, the amplitude of the frontocentrally distributed late slow wave (LSW, 320–440 ms) was modulated by the pronunciation of the foreign phonemes, and the effect changed during the experiment, paralleling the improvement in pronunciation. These results suggest that the LSW may reflect higher-order monitoring processes that signal successful pronunciation and help learn novel phonemes. 

‘‘Altered State of Consciousness’’ (ASC) has been defined as a changed overall pattern of conscious experience, or as the subjective feeling and explicit recognition that one’s own subjective experience has changed. We argue that these traditional definitions fail to draw a clear line between altered and normal states of consciousness (NSC). We outline a new definition of ASC and argue that the proper way to understand the concept of ASC is to regard it as a representational notion: the alteration that has happened is not an alteration of consciousness (or subjective experience) per se, but an alteration in the informational or representational relationships between consciousness and the world. An altered state of consciousness is defined as a state in which the neurocognitive background mechanisms of consciousness have an increased tendency to produce misrepresentations such as hallucinations, delusions, and memory distortions. Paradigm examples of such generally misrepresentational, temporary, and reversible states are dreaming, psychotic episodes, psychedelic drug experiences, some epileptic seizures, and hypnosis in highly hypnotizable subjects. The representational definition of ASC should be applied in the theoretical and empirical studies of ASCs to unify and clarify the conceptual basis of ASC research.

We experience affect—emotions and mood—not only when we are awake but alsoduring dreaming. Despite considerable research, existing theories and empiricalfindings disagree about the frequency, nature, and correlates of dream affect. In thisthesis, I discuss the conceptual and methodological issues that underlie thesediscrepancies. I present five empirical studies, the overall aim of which was toinvestigate the phenomenology and correlates of dream affect and how resultsregarding these are influenced by study methodology. Studies I–III focusedspecifically on methodological issues, by comparing self- and external ratings ofdream affect (Studies I–II) or the affective content of home and laboratory dreamreports (Study III). Studies IV and V investigated the waking well-being and neuralcorrelates of dream affect, respectively. These studies show that results andconclusions regarding dream affect are very different, even contradictory, dependingon whether dream reports have been collected using sleep laboratory awakenings orhome dream diaries (Study III) or whether dream affect has been measured usingself- or external ratings (Studies I–II). Self- and external ratings of dream affect arealso differently correlated with waking well-being (Study IV). Together, theseresults caution against making broad generalizations about affective dreamexperiences from findings obtained with one type of methodology only. The studiesalso demonstrate that dream affect is related to aspects of waking well-being and illbeing(Study IV) and that certain affective states experienced in dreams, specificallyanger, rely on similar neural processes as in wakefulness (Study V). These findingssuggest that the phenomenology and neural correlates of affective experiences are,at least to some extent, continuous across sleep and wakefulness. Overall, this thesisshows how the conceptual and methodological issues in the study of dream affectmay limit the validity, generalizability, and replicability of findings and,consequently, pose challenges to theory building and theory testing. It contributes todream research by highlighting the need, and suggesting ways, to enhance theconceptual clarity and methodological rigour of research on dream affect. Due to theinterdisciplinary nature of the thesis, the theoretical discussion and novel empiricalfindings also have implications for emotion research, sleep research, well-beingresearch, consciousness research, and affective neuroscience.

In the scientific study of dreams, as in the scientific study of any other topic, it is important to first clearly define the phenomenon one is investigating. The definition determines what exactly is being studied. Then, the methods for collecting and analyzing data regarding this phenomenon need to be chosen. These methods determine what kind of results are obtained, to what extent the results reflect the phenomenon of interest, and whether the results can be trusted. This chapter gives an overview of how dream experiences are scientifically studied: how dreams and dreaming are defined, what kinds of methods are used to collect and analyze dream data, and what aspects need to be considered when conducting and reading studies that investigate dream experiences (see also Kahan & Horton, 2012, and Zadra & Domhoff, 2017).

There is increasing evidence that sleep plays an important role inaffective processing. However, it is unclear whether dreaming—the subjectiveexperiences we have during sleep—also serves an affect regulation function.Here, we investigated the within-person relationship between negative affectexperienced in dreams and next-day waking affect level, affect reactivity,and affect regulation. For 5 days, 40 participants reported their dreams andrated their dream affect and post-sleep waking affect level upon morningawakening. Thereafter, they performed an affect reactivity and regulation taskwhich involved viewing neutral and negative pictures with the instructioneither to simply view the pictures or to down-regulate the affect evoked bythese pictures. Multilevel regression analyses showed that the more negativeaffect people experienced in their dreams at night, the more negative affectand the less positive affect they reported the next morning. However, negativedream affect was associated neither with affect reactivity to the pictures norwith the ability to down-regulate negative affect in response to these pictures.In fact, Bayesian analyses favored the null hypotheses. These findings fail toprovide support for the affect regulation function of dreaming and, instead,speak for affective continuity between dreaming and post-sleep wakefulness.

This study demonstrates that different methods for measuring emotional experiences in dreams — self-ratings of dreams using emotion rating scales versus external ratings in the form of content analysis of narrative dream reports — can lead to strikingly different results and contradicting conclusions about the emotional content of home dreams. During 3 consecutive weeks, every morning upon awakening, 44 participants (16 men, 28 women, average age 26.9± 5.1 years) reported their dreams and rated their emotional experiences in those dreams using the modified Differential Emotions Scale. Two external judges rated emotional experiences inthe same 552 (M = 12.55 ± 5.72) home dream reports using the same scale. Comparison of the 2 methods showed that with self-ratings dreams were rated as more emotional and more positive than with external ratings. Moreover, whereas with self-ratings the majority of dreams was rated as positively valenced, with external ratings the majority of dream reports was rated as negatively valenced. Although self- and external ratings converge, at least partially, in the measurement of negative emotional experiences, they diverge greatly in the measurement of positive emotional experiences. On one hand, this discrepancy may result from different biases inherent in the 2 measurement methods highlighting the need to develop better methods for measuring emotional experiences. On the other hand, self- and external ratings may capture different phenomena and should thus be considered complementary and used concurrently. Nevertheless, results suggest that negative emotional experiences can be measured in a more valid and reliable manner than positive emotional experiences.

Affective scientists traditionally have focused on periods of active wakefulness when people are responding to external stimuli or engaging in specific tasks. However, we live much of our lives immersed in experiences not related to the current environment or tasks at hand—mind-wandering (or daydreaming) during wakefulness and dreaming during sleep. Despite being disconnected from the immediate environment, our brains still generate affect during such periods. Yet, research on stimulus-independent affect has remained largely separate from affective science. Here, we suggest that one key future direction for affective science will be to expand our field of view by integrating the wealth of findings from research on mind-wandering, sleep, and dreaming to provide a more comprehensive account of affect across the wake-sleep cycle. In developing our argument, we address two key issues: affect variation across the wake-sleep cycle, and the benefits of expanding the study of affect across the full wake-sleep cycle. In considering these issues, we highlight the methodological and clinical implications for affective science. 

Waking mental well-being is assumed to be tightly linked to sleep and the affective content of dreams. However, empirical research is scant and has mostly focused on ill-being by studying the dreams of people with psychopathology. We explored the relationship between waking well-being and dream affect by measuring not only symptoms of ill-being but also different types and components of well-being. Importantly, this is the first time peace of mind was investigated as a distinct aspect of well-being in a Western sample and in relation to dream content. Healthy participants completed a well-being questionnaire, followed by a three-week daily dream diary and ratings of dream affect. Multilevel analyses showed that peace of mind was related to positive dream affect, whereas symptoms of anxiety were related to negative dream affect. Moreover, waking measures were better related to affect expressed in dream reports rather than participants’ self-ratings of dream affect. We propose that whereas anxiety may reflect affect dysregulation in waking and dreaming, peace of mind reflects enhanced affect regulation in both states of consciousness. Therefore, dream reports may possibly serve as markers of mental health. Finally, our study shows that peace of mind complements existing conceptualizations and measures of well-being.

Well-being consists of several different dimensions, such as hedonic and eudaimonic well-being. However, peace of mind (PoM)—an aspect of well-being characterized by internal peace and harmony—has only recently begun to receive attention. It has been shown that PoM predicts important outcomes, such as depression and anxiety. An open question is what underlies individual differences in PoM. One important factor may be emotion regulation. However, to date, no studies have been conducted on PoM and emotion regulation. Here, we investigated the relationship between individual differences in PoM and trait emotion regulation. In two studies, participants from Finland (Study 1, N = 417) and the US (Study 2, N = 303) completed measures of PoM, trait emotion regulation, and other aspects of well-being and ill-being. Results showed that people with higher levels of PoM displayed a greater tendency to use cognitive reappraisal and a lesser tendency to use expressive suppression. Our findings suggest that adaptive emotion regulation may play an important role in explaining PoM and may serve as a promising target for interventions designed to enhance PoM. 

Affective experiences are central not only to our waking life but also to rapid eye movement(REM) sleep dreams. Despite our increasing understanding of the neural correlates of dreaming, we know little about the neural correlates of dream affect. Frontal alpha asymmetry (FAA) is considered a marker of affective states and traits as well as affect regulation in the waking state. Here, we explored whether FAA during REM sleep and during evening resting wakefulness is related to affective experiences in REM sleep dreams. EEG recordings were obtained from 17humanparticipants (7men)whospent 2 nights in the sleep laboratory. Participants were awakened 5minafter the onset of everyREMstage after which they provided a dream report and rated their dream affect. Two-minute preawakening EEG segments were analyzed. Additionally, 8 min of evening presleep and morning postsleep EEG were recorded during resting wakefulness. Mean spectral power in the alpha band (8 –13 Hz and correspondingFAAwere calculated over the frontal (F4-F3) sites. Results showed that FAA during REM sleep, and during evening resting wakefulness, predicted ratings of dream anger. This suggests that individuals with greater alpha power in the right frontal hemisphere may be less able to regulate (i.e., inhibit) strong affective states, such as anger, in dreams. Additionally, FAA was positively correlated across wakefulness and REM sleep. Together, these findings imply that FAA may serve as a neural correlate of affect regulation not only in the waking but also in the dreaming state.

The aim of this study was to compare the emotional content of dream reports collected at home upon morning awakenings with those collectedin the laboratory upon early and late rapid eye movement (REM) sleep awakenings. Eighteen adults (11 women, seven men; mean age = 25.89 ± 4.85) wrote down their home dreams every morning immediately upon awakening during a 7-day period. Participants also spent two non-consecutive nights in the sleep laboratory where they were awoken 5 min into each continuous REM sleep stage, upon which they gave a verbal dream report. The content of a total of 151 home and 120 laboratory dream reports was analysed by two blind judges using the modified Differential Emotions Scale. It was found that: (1) home dream reports were more emotional than laboratory early REM dream reports, but not more emotional than laboratory late REM dream reports; (2) home dream reports contained a higher density of emotions than laboratory (early or late REM) dream reports; and (3) home dream reports were more negative than laboratory dream reports, but differences between home and early REM reports were larger than those between home and late REM reports. The results suggest that differences between home and laboratory dream reports in overall emotionality may be due to the time of night effect. Whether differences in the density of emotions and negative emotionality are due to sleep environment or due to different reporting procedures and time spent in a sleep stage, respectively, remains to be determined in future studies.

Emotions are central in dreams, specifically in rapid eye movement sleep dreams. Despite a wealth of research on the emotional content of dreams, there is little consensus about the overall emotionality and predominant valence of dreams or about the prevailing specific emotions in dreams. Previous contradictory findings are arguably due to unresolved methodological issues. However, studies that have directly investigated these methodological issues are scarce. In this presentation three studies that investigated the effect of study methodology on the frequency, valence and phenomenological content of dream emotions are discussed. The studies demonstrate that the use of different methods for rating dream emotions (participants who experience the dream vs external judges who analysed the respective dream report) and for collecting dream reports (home vs laboratory setting) leads to very different results and conclusions about the emotional content of dreams. As such, these studies highlight the importance of carefully considering study methodology when conducting and interpreting dream (emotional) content studies.

Expressive suppression refers to the inhibition of emotion-expressive behavior (e.g., facial expressions ofemotion). Although it is a commonly used emotion regulation strategy with well-documented consequences forwell-being, little is known about its underlying mechanisms. In this systematic review, we for the first timesynthesize functional neuroimaging studies on the neural bases of expressive suppression in non-clinical pop-ulations. The 12 studies included in this review contrasted the use of expressive suppression to simply watchingemotional stimuli. Results showed that expressive suppression consistently increased activation of frontoparietalregions, especially the dorsolateral and ventrolateral prefrontal cortices and inferior parietal cortex, butdecreased activation in temporo-occipital areas. Results regarding the involvement of the insula and amygdalawere inconsistent with studies showing increased, decreased, or no changes in activation. These mixed findingsunderscore the importance of distinguishing expressive suppression from other forms of suppression and high-light the need to pay more attention to experimental design and neuroimaging data analysis procedures. Wediscuss these conceptual and methodological issues and provide suggestions for future research.

Despite a surge of studies on the effects of COVID-19 on our well-being, we know little about how the pandemic is reflected in people's spontaneous thoughts and experiences, such as mind-wandering (or daydreaming) during wakefulness and dreaming during sleep. We investigated whether and how COVID-19-related general concern, anxiety, and daily worry are associated with the daily fluctuation of the affective quality of mind-wandering and dreaming, and to what extent these associations can be explained by poor sleep quality. We used ecological momentary assessment by asking participants to rate the affect they experienced during mind-wandering and dreaming in daily logs over a 2-week period. Our preregistered analyses based on 1,755 dream logs from 172 individuals and 1,496 mind-wandering logs from 152 individuals showed that, on days when people reported higher levels of negative affect and lower levels of positive affect during mind-wandering, they experienced more worry. Only daily sleep quality was associated with affect experienced during dreaming at the within-person level: on nights with poorer sleep quality people reported experiencing more negative and less positive affect in dreams and were more likely to experience nightmares. However, at the between-person level, individuals who experienced more daily COVID-19 worry during the study period also reported experiencing more negative affect during mind-wandering and during dreaming. As such, the continuity between daily and nightly experiences seems to rely more on stable trait-like individual differences in affective processing. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Affective experiences occur across the wake-sleep cycle—from active wakefulness to resting wakefulness (i.e., mind-wandering) to sleep (i.e., dreaming). Yet, we know little about the dynamics of affect across these states. We compared the affective ratings of waking, mind-wandering, and dream episodes. Results showed that mind-wandering was more positively valenced than dreaming, and that both mind-wandering and dreaming were more negatively valenced than active wakefulness. We also compared participants’ self-ratings of affect with external ratings of affect (i.e., analysis of affect in verbal reports). With self-ratings all episodes were predominated by positive affect. However, the affective valence of reports changed from positively valenced waking reports to affectively balanced mind-wandering reports to negatively valenced dream reports. These findings show that (1) the positivity bias characteristic to waking experiences decreases across the wake-sleep continuum, and (2) conclusions regarding affective experiences depend on whether self-ratings or verbal reports describing these experiences are analysed.

We investigated whether inconsistencies in previous studies regarding emotional experiencesin dreams derive from whether dream emotions are self-rated or externally evaluated.Seventeen subjects were monitored with polysomnography in the sleep laboratoryand awakened from every rapid eye movement (REM) sleep stage 5 min after the onsetof the stage. Upon awakening, participants gave an oral dream report and rated their dreamemotions using the modified Differential Emotions Scale, whereas external judges rated theparticipants’ emotions expressed in the dream reports, using the same scale. The twoapproaches produced diverging results. Self-ratings, as compared to external ratings,resulted in greater estimates of (a) emotional dreams; (b) positively valenced dreams;(c) positive and negative emotions per dream; and (d) various discrete emotions representedin dreams. The results suggest that this is mostly due to the underrepresentationof positive emotions in dream reports. Possible reasons for this discrepancy are discussed.

D-serine is an endogenous N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) receptor coagonist. It is synthesized from L-serine by serine racemase (SRR), but many aspects of its metabolism remain unclear, especially in the forebrain, which lacks active D-amino acid oxidase (DAO), the major D-serine degradative enzyme. Candidate mechanisms include SRR operating in alpha,beta-eliminase mode (converting D-serine to pyruvate) and regulation by serine transport, in which the alanine-serine-cysteine transporter ASCT2 is implicated. Here we report studies in C6 glioma cells, which "simulate" the forebrain, in that the cells express SRR and ASCT2 but lack DAO activity. We measured D-serine, ASCT2, SRR, and DAO expression and DAO activity in two situations: after incubation of cells for 48 hr with serine isomers and after increased or decreased SRR expression by transfection and RNA interference, respectively. Incubation with serine enantiomers decreased [(3)H]D-serine uptake and ASCT2 mRNA and increased SRR immunoreactivity but did not alter DAO immunoreactivity, and DAO activity remained undetectable. SRR overexpression increased D-serine and pyruvate and decreased [(3)H]D-serine uptake and ASCT2 mRNA but did not affect DAO. SRR knockdown did not alter any of the parameters. Our data suggest that D-serine transport mediated by ASCT2 contributes prominently to D-serine homeostasis when DAO activity is absent. The factors regulating D-serine are important for understanding normal NMDA receptor function and because D-serine, along with DAO and SRR, is implicated in the pathogenesis and treatment of schizophrenia.

Impairments in sleep and affect regulation are evident across a wide range of mental disorders. Understanding the sleep factors that relate to affect regulatory difficulties will inform mechanistic understanding and aid in treatment. Despite rising interest, some research challenges in this area include integrating across different clinical and non-clinical literatures investigating the role of sleep architecture (measured with polysomnography) and experimentally manipulated sleep, as well as integrating more explicit versus implicit affect regulation processes. In this comprehensive review, we use a unifying framework to examine sleep's relationship with implicit-automatic regulation and explicit-controlled regulation, both of which are relevant to mental health (e.g., PTSD and depression). Many studies of implicit-automatic regulation (e.g., fear extinction and safety learning) demonstrate the importance of sleep, and REM sleep specifically. Studies of explicit-controlled regulation (e.g., cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression) are less consistent in their findings, with results differing depending on the type of affect regulation and/or way that sleep was measured or manipulated. There is a clear relationship between objective sleep and affect regulation processes. However, there is a need for 1) more studies focusing on sleep and explicit-controlled affect regulation; 2) replication with the same types of regulation strategies; 3) more studies experimentally manipulating sleep to examine its impact on affect regulation and vice versa in order to infer cause and effect; and 4) more studies looking at sleep's impact on next-day affect regulation (not just overnight change in affect reactivity).

This N = 173,426 social science dataset was collected through the collaborative COVIDiSTRESS Global Survey – an open science effort to improve understanding of the human experiences of the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic between 30th March and 30th May, 2020. The dataset allows a cross-cultural study of psychological and behavioural responses to the Coronavirus pandemic and associated government measures like cancellation of public functions and stay at home orders implemented in many countries. The dataset contains demographic background variables as well as measures of Asian Disease Problem, perceived stress (PSS-10), availability of social provisions (SPS-10), trust in various authorities, trust in governmental measures to contain the virus (OECD trust), personality traits (BFF-15), information behaviours, agreement with the level of government intervention, and compliance with preventive measures, along with a rich pool of exploratory variables and written experiences. A global consortium from 39 countries and regions worked together to build and translate a survey with variables of shared interests, and recruited participants in 47 languages and dialects. Raw plus cleaned data and dynamic visualizations are available.

Tearful crying is a ubiquitous and likely uniquely human phenomenon. Scholars have argued that emotional tears serve an attachment function: Tears are thought to act as a social glue by evoking social support intentions. Initial experimental studies supported this proposition across several methodologies, but these were conducted almost exclusively on participants from North America and Europe, resulting in limited generalizability. This project examined the tears-social support intentions effect and possible mediating and moderating variables in a fully pre-registered study across 7007 participants (24,886 ratings) and 41 countries spanning all populated continents. Participants were presented with four pictures out of 100 possible targets with or without digitally-added tears. We confirmed the main prediction that seeing a tearful individual elicits the intention to support, d = 0.49 [0.43, 0.55]. Our data suggest that this effect could be mediated by perceiving the crying target as warmer and more helpless, feeling more connected, as well as feeling more empathic concern for the crier, but not by an increase in personal distress of the observer. The effect was moderated by the situational valence, identifying the target as part of one's group, and trait empathic concern. A neutral situation, high trait empathic concern, and low identification increased the effect. We observed high heterogeneity across countries that was, via split-half validation, best explained by country-level GDP per capita and subjective well-being with stronger effects for higher-scoring countries. These findings suggest that tears can function as social glue, providing one possible explanation why emotional crying persists into adulthood.