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  • 1.
    Overgaard, Morten
    et al.
    Hammel Neurocenter, Aarhus University Hospital, DK-8000 Aarhus, Denmark.
    Koivisto, Mika
    Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Turku, Finland / Department of Philosophy, University of Turku, SF-20500 Turku, Finland.
    Sørensen, Tomas Alrik
    Department of Psychology, University of Copenhagen, DK-1168 Copenhagen, Denmark.
    Vangkilde, Signe
    Department of Psychology, University of Copenhagen, DK-1168 Copenhagen, Denmark.
    Revonsuo, Antti
    University of Skövde, School of Humanities and Informatics.
    The electrophysiology of introspection2006In: Consciousness and Cognition, ISSN 1053-8100, E-ISSN 1090-2376, Vol. 15, no 4, p. 662-672Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    To study whether the distinction between introspective and non-introspective states of mind is an empirical reality or merely a conceptual distinction, we measured event-related potentials (ERPs) elicited in introspective and non-introspective instruction conditions while the observers were trying to detect the presence of a masked stimulus. The ERPs indicated measurable differences related to introspection in both preconscious and conscious processes. Our data support the hypothesis that introspective states empirically differ from non-introspective states.

  • 2.
    Railo, Henry
    et al.
    Department of Psychology, University of Turku, 20014 Turku, Finland / Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Turku, Turku, Finland.
    Koivisto, Mika
    Department of Psychology, University of Turku, 20014 Turku, Finland / Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Turku, Turku, Finland.
    Revonsuo, Antti
    University of Skövde, School of Humanities and Informatics.
    Tracking the processes behind conscious perception: A review of event-related potential correlates of visual consciousness2011In: Consciousness and Cognition, ISSN 1053-8100, E-ISSN 1090-2376, Vol. 20, no 3, p. 972-983Article, review/survey (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Event-related potential (ERP) studies have attempted to discover the processes that underlie conscious visual perception by contrasting ERPs produced by stimuli that are consciously perceived with those that are not. Variability of the proposed ERP correlates of consciousness is considerable: the earliest proposed ERP correlate of consciousness (P1) coincides with sensory processes and the last one (P3) marks postperceptual processes. A negative difference wave called visual awareness negativity (VAN), typically observed around 200 ms after stimulus onset in occipitotemporal sites, gains strong support for eflecting the processes that correlate with, and possibly enable, aware visual perception. Research suggests that the early parts of conscious processing can proceed independently of top-down attention, although top-down attention may modulate visual processing even before consciousness. Evidence implies that the contents of consciousness are provided by interactions in the ventral stream, but indispensable contributions from dorsal regions influence already low level visual responses.

  • 3.
    Revonsuo, Antti
    et al.
    University of Skövde, School of Humanities and Informatics.
    Valli, Katja
    University of Skövde, School of Humanities and Informatics.
    How to test the threat-simulation theory2008In: Consciousness and Cognition, ISSN 1053-8100, E-ISSN 1090-2376, Vol. 17, no 4, p. 1292-1296Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Malcolm-Smith, Solms, Turnbull and Treduoux (Malcolm-Smith, S., Solms, M., Turnbull, O., & Tredoux, C. (2008). Threat in dreams; An adaptiation? Consciousness and Cognition, 17, 1281-1291.) have made an attempt to test the Threat-Simulation Theory (TST), a theory offering an evolutionary psychological explanation for the function of dreaming (Revonsuo, A. (2000a). The reinterpretation of dreams: An evolutionary hypothesis of the function of dreaming. Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 23(6), 877-901). Malcolm-Smith et al. argue that empirical evidence from their own study as well as from some other studies in the literature does not support the main predictions of the TST: that threatening events are frequent and overrepresented in dreams, that exposure to real threats activates the threat-simulation system, and that dream threats contain realistic rehearsals of threat avoidance responses. Other studies, including or own, have come up with results and conclusions that are in conflict with those of Malcolm-Smith et al. In this commentary, we provide an analysis of the sources of these disagreements, and their implications to the TST. Much of the disagreement seems to stem from differing interpretations of the theory and, consequently, of differing methods to test it.

  • 4.
    Sikka, Pilleriin
    et al.
    University of Skövde, School of Bioscience. University of Skövde, The Systems Biology Research Centre. Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, Department of Psychology, University of Turku, Finland.
    Valli, Katja
    University of Skövde, School of Bioscience. University of Skövde, The Systems Biology Research Centre. Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, Department of Psychology, University of Turku, Finland.
    Virta, Tiina
    Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, Department of Psychology, University of Turku, Finland.
    Revonsuo, Antti
    University of Skövde, School of Bioscience. University of Skövde, The Systems Biology Research Centre.
    I know how you felt last night, or do I?: Self- and external ratings of emotions in REM dreams2014In: Consciousness and Cognition, ISSN 1053-8100, E-ISSN 1090-2376, Vol. 25, p. 51-66Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We investigated whether inconsistencies in previous studies regarding emotional experiencesin dreams derive from whether dream emotions are self-rated or externally evaluated.Seventeen subjects were monitored with polysomnography in the sleep laboratoryand awakened from every rapid eye movement (REM) sleep stage 5 min after the onsetof the stage. Upon awakening, participants gave an oral dream report and rated their dreamemotions using the modified Differential Emotions Scale, whereas external judges rated theparticipants’ emotions expressed in the dream reports, using the same scale. The twoapproaches produced diverging results. Self-ratings, as compared to external ratings,resulted in greater estimates of (a) emotional dreams; (b) positively valenced dreams;(c) positive and negative emotions per dream; and (d) various discrete emotions representedin dreams. The results suggest that this is mostly due to the underrepresentationof positive emotions in dream reports. Possible reasons for this discrepancy are discussed.

  • 5.
    Tuominen, Jarno
    et al.
    Department of Psychology, University of Turku, Finland / Turku Brain and Mind Center, University of Turku, Finland.
    Stenberg, Tuula
    Department of Psychology, University of Turku, Finland.
    Revonsuo, Antti
    University of Skövde, School of Bioscience. University of Skövde, The Systems Biology Research Centre. Department of Psychology, University of Turku, Finland / Turku Brain and Mind Center, University of Turku, Finland.
    Valli, Katja
    University of Skövde, School of Bioscience. University of Skövde, The Systems Biology Research Centre. Department of Psychology, University of Turku, Finland / Turku Brain and Mind Center, University of Turku, Finland.
    Social contents in dreams: An empirical test of the Social Simulation Theory2019In: Consciousness and Cognition, ISSN 1053-8100, E-ISSN 1090-2376, Vol. 69, p. 133-145Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Social Simulation Theory (SST) considers the function of dreaming to be the simulation of social events. The Sociality Bias and the Strengthening hypotheses of SST were tested. Social Content Scale (SCS) was developed to quantify social events. Additionally, we attempted to replicate a previous finding (McNamara et al., 2005, Psychological Science) of REM dreams as predisposed to aggressive, and NREM dreams to prosocial interactions. Further, we investigated the frequency and quality of interactions in late vs early REM and NREM dreams. Data consisted of wake, REM and NREM home dream reports (N = 232, 116, 116, respectively) from 15 students. Dreams overrepresented social events compared to wake reports, supporting the Sociality Bias hypothesis. However, the Strengthening Hypothesis was not supported. We weren't able to replicate the McNamara et al. finding, and no time of night effect was found. While SST gained partial support, further research on social contents in dreams is required. © 2019 Elsevier Inc.

  • 6.
    Valli, Katja
    University of Skövde, School of Humanities and Informatics.
    Dreaming in the multilevel framework2011In: Consciousness and Cognition, ISSN 1053-8100, E-ISSN 1090-2376, Vol. 20, no 4, p. 1084-1090Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Biological realism (Revonsuo, 2001, 2006) states that dreaming is a biological phenomenon and therefore explainable in naturalistic terms, similar to the explanation of other biological phenomena. In the biological sciences, the structure of explanations can be described with the help of a framework called ‘multilevel explanation’. The multilevel model provides a context that assists to clarify what needs to be explained and how, and how to place different theories into the same model. Here, I will argue that the multilevel framework would be useful when we try to construct scientific explanations of dreaming.

1 - 6 of 6
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