Concept Formation and Concept Grounding
2014 (English)In: Philosophia (Ramat Gan), ISSN 0048-3893, E-ISSN 1574-9274, Vol. 42, no 3, 827-839 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Recently Carrie S. Jenkins formulated an epistemology of mathematics, or rather arithmetic, respecting apriorism, empiricism, and realism. Central is an idea of concept grounding. The adequacy of this idea has been questioned e.g. concerning the grounding of the mathematically central concept of set (or class), and of composite concepts. In this paper we present a view of concept formation in mathematics, based on ideas from Carnap, leading to modifications of Jenkins’s epistemology that may solve some problematic issues with her ideas. But we also present some further problems with her view, concerning the role of proof for mathematical knowledge.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer Science+Business Media B.V., 2014. Vol. 42, no 3, 827-839 p.
Epistemology, Mathematics, Knowledge of theorems, The role of proof, Empiricism, Concept grounding, Concept formation
Research subject Natural sciences
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:his:diva-9075DOI: 10.1007/s11406-014-9528-8ISI: 000342167800019ScopusID: 2-s2.0-84901729733OAI: oai:DiVA.org:his-9075DiVA: diva2:716760