Eliminative materialism is a view that has been sparsely acknowledged and often overlooked when it comes to providing us with a criterion of what it takes for you and me to persist over time. This owes much to its counterintuitive belief in the non-existence of folk-psychological notions, such as persons. Against a backdrop of philosophical and scientific inquiry, this paper amounts to providing such a criterion in the form of f-organisms, taking a different route based on emergent descriptions, instead of conventional reductive explanations. The temporal plasticity (change over time) of such f-organisms display stable persistence conditions despite their constant state of reconstruction. What informs the question of identity in such a paradigm is dealt with accordingly, and the notion of the self is put in a context in which it can no longer be said to be the self we are familiar with – a context in which the center fails to hold. The imperative question for any of such criteria will be to accommodate the concept of identity as unconstrained and far away from uncertainty as possible. The main theme will thus be to reassess the general notion of diachronic identity to include our identity over time, and make explicit the various implications for such a view.