The `grounding problem' poses the question of how the function and internal mechanisms of a machine, natural or artificial, can be intrinsic to the machine itself, i.e. independent of an external designer or observer. Searle's and Harnad's analyses of the grounding problem are briefly reviewed as well as different approaches to solving it, based on the cognitivist and the enactive paradigms in cognitive science. It is argued that, although the two categories of grounding approaches differ in their nature and the problems they have to face, both, so far, fail to provide fully grounded systems for similar reasons: Only isolated parts of systems are grounded, whereas other, essential, parts are left ungrounded. Hence, it is further argued that grounding should instead be understood and approached as radical bottom-up development of complete robotic agents in interaction with their environment.
Riegler, Alexander & Peschl, Markus (eds.) Does Representation need Reality? - Proceedings of the International Conference 'New Trends in Cognitive Science' (NTCS'97) - Perspectives from Cognitive Science, Neuroscience, Epistemology, and Artificial Life. Austrian Society of Cognitive Science (ASoCS) Technical Report 97-01. Vienna, Austria, May 1997.
HS-IDA-TR-97-005