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Parthemore, J. & Whitby, B. (2023). Artefactual ethics as opportunity to rethink “natural” ethics. In: Berndt Müller (Ed.), Proceedings of the AISB Convention 2023: Swansea University 13/14 April 2023. Paper presented at 2023 Convention of the Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of Behaviour, AISB 2023 Swansea 13 April 2023 through 14 April 2023 (pp. 107-112). The Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of Behaviour
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Artefactual ethics as opportunity to rethink “natural” ethics
2023 (English)In: Proceedings of the AISB Convention 2023: Swansea University 13/14 April 2023 / [ed] Berndt Müller, The Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of Behaviour , 2023, p. 107-112Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

This paper argues that, within the ethics community, the wider philosophical establishment and society in general, people have been far too quick to let themselves and, all too often, each other off the hook, at the same time as setting impossibly high standards for artefactual moral agents to meet, such that the artefactual agents should be guaranteed to make no mistakes. If artefacts are ever to be considered candidates for moral agency, then they should be held to no higher (and, at the same time, not significantly lower) a standard than what human beings can achieve. Meanwhile, the prospects of artefactual moral agency invite the opportunity for human moral agents to reconsider the standards they set for themselves and hold themselves to a higher standard. 

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
The Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of Behaviour, 2023
Keywords
High standards, Human being, Moral agents
National Category
Ethics Philosophy Human Computer Interaction
Research subject
Consciousness and Cognitive Neuroscience
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:his:diva-23381 (URN)2-s2.0-85176341706 (Scopus ID)978-1-7138-7946-6 (ISBN)978-1-908187-85-7 (ISBN)
Conference
2023 Convention of the Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of Behaviour, AISB 2023 Swansea 13 April 2023 through 14 April 2023
Note

© AISB Convention 2023. All rights reserved.

Available from: 2023-11-23 Created: 2023-11-23 Last updated: 2023-11-24Bibliographically approved
Kaipainen, M., Hautamäki, A. & Parthemore, J. (2023). Conceptualization for intended action: A dynamic model. Philosophical Psychology, 1-36
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Conceptualization for intended action: A dynamic model
2023 (English)In: Philosophical Psychology, ISSN 0951-5089, E-ISSN 1465-394X, p. 1-36Article in journal (Refereed) Epub ahead of print
Abstract [en]

Concepts are the building blocks of higher-order cognition and consciousness. Building on Conceptual Spaces Theory (CST) and proceeding from the assumption that concepts are inherently dynamic, this paper provides historical context to and significantly elaborates the previously offered Iterative Subdivision Model (ISDM) with the goal of pushing it toward empirical testability. The paper describes how agents in continuous interaction with their environment adopt an intentional orientation, estimate the utility of the concept(s) applicable to action in the current context, engage in practical action, and adopt any new concepts that emerge: a largely pre-intellectual cycle that repeats essentially without interruption over the conceptual agent’s lifetime. This paper elaborates utility optimization by establishing three constraints on concept formation/evaluation – non-redundancy, distinctiveness, and proportionality – embedding them in a quasi-mathematical model intended for development into a formal logic. The notion of a distinctor – a quality dimension of the conceptual space in focus at any given time, used for making what we call a difference distinction – is key. The primary contribution of the revised ISDM is the way it relates concepts to action via utility optimization/actualization and the way it describes the emergence of quality dimensions through trial-by-action (trial and error), something previous presentations of CST have failed to address.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Taylor & Francis Group, 2023
Keywords
Concepts, conceptual agency, conceptual dynamics, distinctors, Iterative Subdivision Model, Conceptual Spaces Theory
National Category
Philosophy Information Systems, Social aspects Psychology (excluding Applied Psychology)
Research subject
Consciousness and Cognitive Neuroscience
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:his:diva-22175 (URN)10.1080/09515089.2022.2164263 (DOI)000908244300001 ()2-s2.0-85145923087 (Scopus ID)
Note

CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

Received 12 Oct 2021, Accepted 27 Dec 2022, Published online: 06 Jan 2023

CONTACT Joel Parthemore joel.parthemore@his.se University of Skövde, Daltorps skola LGH 1004, Skövde 54192, Sweden

Available from: 2023-01-09 Created: 2023-01-09 Last updated: 2023-05-03Bibliographically approved
Parthemore, J. (2023). Intelligence, super-intelligence, superintelligence++, and ChatGPT: Searching for Substance amidst the Hype. In: Berndt Müller (Ed.), Proceedings of the AISB Convention 2023: Swansea University 13/14 April 2023. Paper presented at 2023 Convention of the Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of Behaviour, AISB 2023, Swansea 13 April 2023 through 14 April 2023 (pp. 15-22). The Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of Behaviour
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Intelligence, super-intelligence, superintelligence++, and ChatGPT: Searching for Substance amidst the Hype
2023 (English)In: Proceedings of the AISB Convention 2023: Swansea University 13/14 April 2023 / [ed] Berndt Müller, The Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of Behaviour , 2023, p. 15-22Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

ChatGPT has been ubiquitous in the news lately: university lecturers bemoaning their inability ever to mark essays again, journalists gushing about how ChatGPT has "soared past" the Turing test in its pursuit of greater challenges. At a time when world-renowned philosophers are sounding alarms about super-intelligent AI, it's a good time to look at the reality in contrast to the hype. Tho position taken by this paper is that, for all the wonders of what ChatGPT can do, it is more like Joseph Weizenbaum's simple-minded Eliza than it is different. A careful discussion of what ChatGPT can and cannot do leads into a fruitful discussion of the nature of intelligence itself and what, if anything, is meant by talk of super-intelligence and super-intelligence++. 

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
The Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of Behaviour, 2023
Keywords
Simple++, Superintelligence, Turing tests
National Category
Human Aspects of ICT Philosophy
Research subject
Consciousness and Cognitive Neuroscience
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:his:diva-23382 (URN)2-s2.0-85176295323 (Scopus ID)978-1-7138-7946-6 (ISBN)978-1-908187-85-7 (ISBN)
Conference
2023 Convention of the Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of Behaviour, AISB 2023, Swansea 13 April 2023 through 14 April 2023
Note

© AISB Convention 2023.All rights reserved

Available from: 2023-11-23 Created: 2023-11-23 Last updated: 2023-11-24Bibliographically approved
Parthemore, J. & Whitby, B. (2022). Artefactual ethics as opportunity for rethinking “natural” ethics. In: Hadi Banaee; Erik Billing (Ed.), Proceedings of the 17th SweCog Conference: Örebro 2022, 16-17 June. Paper presented at 17th SweCog Conference, SweCog2022, Örebro, 16-17 June, 2022 (pp. 28-31). Skövde: University of Skövde
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Artefactual ethics as opportunity for rethinking “natural” ethics
2022 (English)In: Proceedings of the 17th SweCog Conference: Örebro 2022, 16-17 June / [ed] Hadi Banaee; Erik Billing, Skövde: University of Skövde , 2022, , p. 32p. 28-31Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

This paper serves as introduction to a significantly longer paper in progress. It argues that, within the ethics community, the wider philosophical establishment and society in general, people have been far too lax about what to accept as morally “right” behaviour – far too quick to let themselves and, all too often, each other off the hook. By drawing comparisons to artefactual behaviour and the objections people raise to calling that behaviour the morally acceptable behaviour of authentic moral agents, this paper lays out a framework by which human ethics and meta-ethics can more fruitfully be approached. An earlier paper of ours (Parthemore and Whitby, 2014) argued that, for an action to be morally right, one must have a convergence of the right motivations, the right means, and the right consequences. The underlying insight is that deontological, virtue-ethics-based, and consequentialist accounts all have their necessary role to play, but each tends to get too focused on itself and its merits to the loss of the bigger picture; while utilitarian accounts, as perhaps the most prominent division within consequentialism, face the further problem of failing to allow for those occasions where the needs of the few, or the one, outweigh the needs of the many, as Ursula K. LeGuin (1973) so devastatingly addressed. Although the requirement to align motivations, means, and consequences may seem impossibly onerous, it need not be, provided one is prepared to allow that moral behaviour is far more difficult to achieve, either for artefacts or human beings, than it might seem at first glance. Mistakes will be made. Perhaps it matters more to take responsibility for those mistakes than to assure oneself, despite reasonable argument to the contrary, that one has avoided them. It is time to hold artefactual and natural agent alike to a higher standard

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Skövde: University of Skövde, 2022. p. 32
Series
SUSI, ISSN 1653-2325 ; 2022:1
National Category
Philosophy Ethics
Research subject
Consciousness and Cognitive Neuroscience
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:his:diva-21453 (URN)978-91-983667-9-2 (ISBN)
Conference
17th SweCog Conference, SweCog2022, Örebro, 16-17 June, 2022
Available from: 2022-06-28 Created: 2022-06-28 Last updated: 2022-07-12Bibliographically approved
de Melo, C., Petters, D., Parthemore, J., Moffatt, D. & Becker-Asano, C. (2021). Introduction to the Special Issue on Computational Modelling of Emotion. IEEE Transactions on Affective Computing, 12(2), 277-278
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Introduction to the Special Issue on Computational Modelling of Emotion
Show others...
2021 (English)In: IEEE Transactions on Affective Computing, E-ISSN 1949-3045, Vol. 12, no 2, p. 277-278Article in journal, Editorial material (Other academic) Published
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
IEEE, 2021
National Category
Human Computer Interaction
Research subject
Consciousness and Cognitive Neuroscience
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:his:diva-19978 (URN)10.1109/TAFFC.2021.3073214 (DOI)000655791600001 ()2-s2.0-85107111149 (Scopus ID)
Available from: 2021-06-24 Created: 2021-06-24 Last updated: 2023-12-05Bibliographically approved
Parthemore, J. (2021). The Overselling of Super-intelligence: Or, Why Skynet (Probably!) Isn’t Taking Over Any Time Soon. In: Erik Billing; Andreas Kalckert (Ed.), Proceedings of the 16th SweCog Conference: . Paper presented at SweCog 2021, the 16th SweCog conference, virtual from Skövde, Sweden, November 10-12, 2021 (pp. 35-37). Skövde: University of Skövde
Open this publication in new window or tab >>The Overselling of Super-intelligence: Or, Why Skynet (Probably!) Isn’t Taking Over Any Time Soon
2021 (English)In: Proceedings of the 16th SweCog Conference / [ed] Erik Billing; Andreas Kalckert, Skövde: University of Skövde , 2021, p. 35-37Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Skövde: University of Skövde, 2021
Series
SUSI, ISSN 1653-2325 ; 2021:2
Keywords
human intelligence, artificial intelligence, AI, super-intelligence
National Category
Computer Sciences Neurosciences Philosophy
Research subject
Consciousness and Cognitive Neuroscience
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:his:diva-20939 (URN)978-91-983667-8-5 (ISBN)
Conference
SweCog 2021, the 16th SweCog conference, virtual from Skövde, Sweden, November 10-12, 2021
Note

joel.parthemore@his.se

Available from: 2022-02-24 Created: 2022-02-24 Last updated: 2022-04-27Bibliographically approved
Parthemore, J. (2021). Will the real artist stand up?: Computational creativity as mirror to the human soul. In: AISB Convention 2021: Communication and Conversations. Paper presented at AISB Convention 2021, Communication and Conversations, Online 7-9 April 2021 (pp. 72-78). The Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of Behaviour
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Will the real artist stand up?: Computational creativity as mirror to the human soul
2021 (English)In: AISB Convention 2021: Communication and Conversations, The Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of Behaviour , 2021, p. 72-78Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

This paper argues that a too-expansive view on creativity is unhelpful at best and deeply misleading at worst. As with “representation”, the word “creativity” comes value-laden in ways that researchers cannot lightly get away from, if they can escape at all; simply claiming that one is using the word in a technical sense is not a solution. Neither should one take an overly narrow view that takes advantage of a priori arguments to deny creativity to classes of agents or putative agents solely by their membership in those classes. The paper proceeds by offering a definition of creativity meant to prejudice neither human being nor artefact; then setting out the conditions for a putative creative agent to be a creative agent, concluding that no existing artefactual agents appear to fall into this category; finally, addressing the question of why computers, computer programs, robots, and related artefacts have nevertheless had a profound – indeed, transformational – effect on human creativity, taking creativity to places that neither human beings nor artefacts could have gone on their own. It ends with a discussion of the person I see as one of the key early voices on computational creativity. 

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
The Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of Behaviour, 2021
Keywords
Computational creativities, Human being, Human creativity, Setting outs, Technical sense, Artificial intelligence, computational creativity, consciousness, concepts, semiotic hierarchy, Alan Turing
National Category
Information Systems Philosophy
Research subject
Consciousness and Cognitive Neuroscience
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:his:diva-20258 (URN)2-s2.0-85109086549 (Scopus ID)978-1-7138-2942-3 (ISBN)
Conference
AISB Convention 2021, Communication and Conversations, Online 7-9 April 2021
Note

© 2021 AISB Convention 2021: Communication and Conversations. All rights reserved.

Originally intended for (postponed to 2021): The 7th Computational Creativity Symposium at AISB 2020 (The Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of Behaviour), Communication and Conversations (CC2020), London, 8 April, 2020

Available from: 2021-08-05 Created: 2021-08-05 Last updated: 2021-10-26Bibliographically approved
Parthemore, J. (2019). On the essentially dynamic nature of concepts: Constant if incremental motion in conceptual spaces. In: Mauri Kaipainen, Frank Zenker, Antti Hautamäki, Peter Gärdenfors (Ed.), Conceptual Spaces: Elaborations and Expectations (pp. 83-102). Cham: Springer
Open this publication in new window or tab >>On the essentially dynamic nature of concepts: Constant if incremental motion in conceptual spaces
2019 (English)In: Conceptual Spaces: Elaborations and Expectations / [ed] Mauri Kaipainen, Frank Zenker, Antti Hautamäki, Peter Gärdenfors, Cham: Springer, 2019, p. 83-102Chapter in book (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

Concepts are the means by which we structure our understanding of the world and consequently the primary means by which we encounter it. It is commonly assumed that one of the essential characteristics of concepts – regardless of referent – is their stability, tending toward stasis;and, indeed, it can be hard to see how concepts can otherwise be systematic and productive, inthe way they are conventionally taken to be. Even the question has been raised whether conceptscan change; on some prominent accounts, they cannot. The Unified Conceptual Space Theory(UCST) – an extension of Conceptual Spaces Theory – makes the controversial claim that conceptsnot only are subject to change over an iterative lifecycle but that, at an underlying level, they are in a state of continuous motion; indeed, they must be to function as they do. Mere openness to change is not enough. Even the most seemingly fixed of concepts – mathematical concepts are the paradigm example – can be seen to evolve and continually be evolving as our understanding of mathematics evolves. UCST suggests that concepts possess an intrinsic tension that appears topresent a contradiction: to be able to apply in more or less the same way across unboundedly many contexts (systematicity) and to be able to combine coherently with other concepts (productivity),they must be relatively stable; and yet, since each new application context is, in some nontrivial way, different from every previous context in ways that do not fit within neat conceptual boundaries,they must adapt each time to fit. In a physical world we have reason to view as ultimately one of fluidity, of processes and motion rather than stable entities, concepts should probably have a similar nature.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Cham: Springer, 2019
Series
Synthese Library (SYLI): Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science ; 405
Keywords
concepts, Conceptual Spaces Theory, Unified Conceptual Space Theory
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Consciousness and Cognitive Neuroscience
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:his:diva-18518 (URN)10.1007/978-3-030-12800-5_6 (DOI)978-3-030-12799-2 (ISBN)978-3-030-12800-5 (ISBN)
Available from: 2020-06-15 Created: 2020-06-15 Last updated: 2021-06-20Bibliographically approved
Parthemore, J. (2017). Consciousness, semiosis, and the unbinding problem. Language & Communication, 54, 36-46
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Consciousness, semiosis, and the unbinding problem
2017 (English)In: Language & Communication, ISSN 0271-5309, E-ISSN 1873-3395, Vol. 54, p. 36-46Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Any wider discussion of semiosis must address not only how semiosis came about, in terms of evolutionary pressures and requisite cognitive infrastructure, but also – as importantly, and too easily forgotten – how human beings experience and have experienced it, and how that experience reflects (at the same time shaping) its development. Much discussion has focused on resolving how inputs from external sensory modalities combine with internal brain processes to produce unified consciousness: the so-called binding problem. One might wish to distinguish between the coming together of conscious experience in terms of underlying mechanics and the seemingly unavoidable reality that human beings experience a consciousness that is, from the onset, phenomenally unified. The unbinding problem is shown to be potentially just as important to telling the story.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Elsevier, 2017
Keywords
binding problem, experience, semiosis, semiotic resources, multimodality, language origins
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Consciousness and Cognitive Neuroscience
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:his:diva-13116 (URN)10.1016/j.langcom.2016.10.004 (DOI)000400213700004 ()2-s2.0-85006701122 (Scopus ID)
Available from: 2016-11-18 Created: 2016-11-18 Last updated: 2017-11-27Bibliographically approved
Parthemore, J. (2017). Understanding empathy: Metaphysical starting assumptions in the modeling of empathy and emotions. In: Joanna Bryson, Marina De Vos, Julian Padget (Ed.), Proceedings of AISB Annual Convention 2017: Society with AI. Paper presented at 2017 convention of the Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and the Simulation of Behaviour (SSAISB) (pp. 263-267). Bath, UK: The Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and the Simulation of Behaviour (AISB)
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Understanding empathy: Metaphysical starting assumptions in the modeling of empathy and emotions
2017 (English)In: Proceedings of AISB Annual Convention 2017: Society with AI / [ed] Joanna Bryson, Marina De Vos, Julian Padget, Bath, UK: The Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and the Simulation of Behaviour (AISB) , 2017, p. 263-267Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

This paper has three main purposes: to set out the relationship between empathy and related phenomena, including emotional contagion; to explain how metaphysical starting assumptions regarding the nature of empathy predispose one toward one or another account of these phenomena and toward different interpretations of the same empirical data -- often radically different; and to use recent discussions of empathy in the phenomenological and enactive communities (in particular their rejection of theory of mind accounts) to put forward a radical proposal. In the paradigmatic cases, one feels that one is feeling (at least some substantive portion of) what another person is feeling: “I feel your pain”. But there are certain intense experiences along with certain related but less intense ones where there is, I claim, a single joint experience among two or more individuals. One could call these experiences “extreme” empathy. This is how phenomenologists should, I think, cash out the frequent claim that in many circumstances, one agent “directly” experiences the emotional state of another without requiring the mediation of anything like theory of mind.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Bath, UK: The Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and the Simulation of Behaviour (AISB), 2017
Keywords
empathy, emotions, metaphysical starting assumptions, joint experience
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Consciousness and Cognitive Neuroscience
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:his:diva-14141 (URN)2-s2.0-85041215270 (Scopus ID)
Conference
2017 convention of the Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and the Simulation of Behaviour (SSAISB)
Available from: 2017-09-21 Created: 2017-09-21 Last updated: 2018-03-08Bibliographically approved
Organisations
Identifiers
ORCID iD: ORCID iD iconorcid.org/0000-0002-1221-6699

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